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Is Animal Suffering Really All That Matters? The Move from Suffering to Vegetarianism 




The animal liberation movement, among other goals, seeks an end to the use of animals for food. 
Philosophers who write against animal exploitation agree on the goal but differ in their 
approaches: Deontologists argue that rearing animals for food infringes animals’ inherent right to 
life. Utilitarians claim that discontinuing the use of animals for food will result in the 
maximization of utility. Virtue-oriented theorists argue that using animals for food is an 
unvirtuous practice. Despite their different approaches, arguments for vegetarianism or veganism 
have a common step. They move from the notion of suffering to the conclusion of vegetarianism 
or veganism. In this paper I suggest that the notion of animal suffering is not necessary in order 
to condemn the practices of animal farming. I propose the possibility of defending vegetarianism 
or veganism on the basis of arguments that do not rest on the notion of animal suffering, but 
rather rely on aesthetic principles, the avoidance of violence, and preservation of the 
environment. 
 









Animal Suffering Is Not All that Matters  
I. Introduction 
The modern animal liberation movement is fueled by the work of Richard Ryder (1974, 
1989, 2010, 2003), Peter Singer (1975), Tom Regan (1983), James Rachels (1990) and many 
others. These philosophers have proposed arguments in favor of vegetarianism or veganism on 
the basis of utilitarian, deontological, or natural rights principles, or some combination of these 
theories. For example, Ryder (1999) relies on the principle of “Painism,” combines the 
utilitarianism of Singer with the rights theory of Regan. As Francione (1996) writes, “Painism, a 
doctrine developed by Richard Ryder, purports to combine rights- and utility-type considerations 
by combining ‘Singer’s emphasis upon pain with Regan’s concern for the individual.” (p. 224) 
These arguments are well known to anyone who has even the slightest interest in animal ethics, 
and so it will not be necessary to spend time rehearsing them here.  
Furthermore, there are philosophers (for example Alvaro, 2019) writing about animal 
ethics who take a different approach from that of consequential and deontological ethics. These 
philosophers argue that the correct way to approach the question of our responsibility toward 
animals is to frame the issue in terms of whether the practice of rearing animals for food are 
virtuous and unvirtuous. Rather than arguing that animals have inherent rights or that they should 
factored in a utilitarian calculus, we are better off realizing that raising animals for food, quite 
apart from rights and utility, is unvirtuous: e.g., callous, intemperate, self-indulgent, and base.  
Although each of the theories sketched above proposes its unique approach to animal 
ethics, all of them have a common linchpin, which is the notion of animal suffering. 
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Utilitarianism, painism, subject-of-a-life, and virtue-based theories all share in common a move 
from the notion of suffering to the conclusion of vegetarianism or veganism. In what follows, I 
would like to suggest that there are other promising avenues to explore, besides the notion of 
animal suffering, that may lead to the same conclusions, i.e., that we should condemn animal 
farming and that we should become vegans or vegetarians. I do not intend to undermine the 
importance of animal suffering as a criterion for respecting animals. I believe that animals do 
suffer. However, an interesting question that this paper explores is, “If we discovered that 
animals do not suffer at all, would there be other arguments against animal exploitation?” I argue 
that there are other important resources that can be used to condemn the practice of intensive 
animal agriculture. These resources are what I term aesthetic- and gustatory-based. I shall 
discuss them in order.  
 
II. Aesthetic-based argument 
The aesthetic-based argument is twofold: the first aspect has to do with the unaesthetic 
nature of intensive animal agriculture. The second aspect pertains the unaesthetic nature of the 
violence involved in intensive animal agriculture. The first part of the argument can be expressed 
as follows: 
1. We ought to eliminate those practices that produce unnecessarily repugnant sights, 
sounds, and odors.  
2. Intensive animal farming causes unnecessarily repugnant sights, sounds, and odors.  
3. Consequently, we ought to eliminate intensive animal farming.  
The animal ethics literature has not completely ignored aesthetic concerns as promising ways to 
counter intensive animal agriculture. However, aesthetic principles are often overlooked. There 
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are important philosophical arguments that can support an aesthetic-based argument against 
animal agriculture. Consider for example Mary Midgley’s notion of the “Yuk Factor.” Midgley 
writes, “it is especially unfortunate that people often now have the impression that while feeling 
is against them, reason quite simply favors the new developments.” (Midgley, 2000, p. 7) Here 
Midgley is discussing the emotional reaction of people to certain forms of biotechnology. She 
points out that in moral reflection, it is usual to favor reason and discount emotion. But it is a 
mistake to dismiss emotion forthright. The emotion-vs.-reason dichotomy is not exactly accurate. 
After all, emotions often are pre-rational, but not irrational, reasons. When a practice is 
universally, or nearly so, repugnant, we should not dismiss our emotional reaction and treat it as 
morally unimportant. The “yuck factor” is the not-yet-articulated moral reaction toward certain 
practices that must be seriously considered, because it requires time to rise to the rational level 
and be articulated. As Midgley points out, 
 
Feelings always incorporate thoughts—often ones that are not yet fully 
articulated—and reasons are always found in response to particular sorts of 
feelings. On both sides, we need to look for the hidden partners. We have to 
articulate the thoughts that underlie emotional objections and also note the 
emotional element in contentions that may claim to be purely rational. The best 
way to do this is often to start by taking the intrinsic objections more seriously. If 
we look below the surface of what seems to be mere feeling we may find thoughts 
that show how the two aspects are connected. (Midgley, 2000, p. 8) 
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Regarding the treatment of animals, the nearly uniform aversion that people experience to blood, 
bodily fluid, bad odor, and other “yucky” aspects characteristic of animal rearing and meat 
production, is not merely subjective. This aversion denotes important moral implications. Even 
many meat eaters show repugnance toward the processes involved in meat production, from the 
squalid rearing aspect of animals to their slaughtering. Not surprisingly, slaughterhouses are 
hidden from plain sight. And also not surprisingly, meat eaters typically avoid acknowledging 
from where their meat comes. (Kunst and Hohle, 2016) Meat eaters consume cooked and 
seasoned, rather than raw, animal flesh. As Kuhen (2004) notes, people like their vegetables to 
look like vegetables, but do not like their meat to look like animals. the simple explanation is that 
the process of rearing animals, slaughterhouses, and the final products, the animal parts that 
people consume, are inherently repugnant.  
A. G. Holdier’s (2016) proposes a version of an aesthetic-based objection to meat. 
Holdier presents an interesting argument inspired by the writings of Henry Stephens Salt. 
Writing about the immorality of slaughterhouses in the late 1800s, Salt is a pioneer of animal 
rights and vegetarianism. As Holdier points out, Salt’s arguments are not formal, though 
represent the beginning of a promising aesthetic-based argument: “Slaughterhouses are 
disgusting, therefore they should not be promoted.” (Holdier, 2016, p. 631) Holdier seeks to 
build an argument upon Salt’s aesthetic considerations regarding slaughterhouses. Two 
important steps in Holdier’s argument are, first, the fact that the conditions in factory farms and 
slaughterhouses are objectively dreadful. It is not necessary to present an argument to show that 
animal farming are disgusting. Nowadays, the horror of slaughterhouses and animal suffering in 
general are very well documented. There exist numerous YouTube video exposés as well as 
articles and books describing and show the horrific conditions of animal farms and 
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slaughterhouses. The second step is to suggest a moral dimension to aesthetic judgments to 
shows that the repugnant often signals that something is immoral or bad for us. (Holdier, 2016, p. 
633) The connection with morality and aesthetics is, obviously, not unusual. Holdier proposes 
such a connection in the light of recent work in the psychology of disgust, which suggests that 
our reaction to the ugly is a warning that something is dangerous or wrong for us. (Chapman and 
Anderson, 2014) Consequently, it is plausible to assume that our repugnance toward the 
conditions of farm animals and the ghastly processes involved in the production of meat stems 
from an internal cognitive mechanism that recognizes the wrongness of such practices: “an 
internal preventive measure relative to the potential danger of disease and bodily harm.” (2016, 
p. 638) 
Furthermore, consider that there are certain mechanisms used to subvert our opposition to 
animal exploitation. (Luke, 1992) For example, early on in our lives we have to be conditioned 
to regard animals as food. As children, animal food is presented in forms that do not remotely 
resemble animals, such as mush or nuggets or meals labeled “happy.” As Josephine Donovan 
(2006) correctly notes, “Children have to be educated out of the early sympathy they feel for 
animals.” (p. 323) Children are kept uninformed of the process required to turn animals into their 
“happy meals.” Children’s books often depict animals as happy friends, rather than showing 
them amassed in cages inside factory farms. Virtually all children are not taught that burgers and 
steaks are body parts of the same cute and loving animals about which children see in their 
books. There is a clear mechanism that disconnects children’s understanding of the lives of 
animals. As Carol J. Adams notes,  
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We live in a culture that has institutionalized the oppression of animals on at least 
two levels: in formal structures such as slaughterhouses, meat markets, zoos, 
laboratories, and circuses, and through our language. That we refer to meat eating 
rather than to corpse eating is a central example of how our language transmits the 
dominant culture’s approval of this activity. (Adams, 2015, p. 47) 
 
An aesthetic-based argument, therefore, considers the aesthetic value loss that the 
practices required to produce meat causes. The point of the argument is that a life that contains a 
lesser amount of unpleasant sights sounds and odors is more conducive to flourishing than a life 
filled with unaesthetic sights and violent events. The world has many terrible features, such as 
natural diseases, crime, pollution, discrimination, and more. Fortunately the world still has many 
positive and beautiful characteristics. For example, when we contemplate nature, unless one is 
completely insensitive about it or unmoved by it, we find objective beauty. Animals and insects 
represent one of the many beautiful aspects of nature. They are unique and render nature 
beautiful just like the elements that constitute a great painting. Imagine how sad the world would 
be without the colors and sounds of animals. It would be comparable to the painting Mona Lisa 
without the Mona Lisa. Granted, the meat industry does not intend to wipe out animals from the 
world. However, my point is that the meat industry affects negatively the beauty of nature 
damaging it and adding violent and unpleasant features in the world. Consider for example how 
cutting down trees to build a gas station, oil spills in the ocean, pollution, and more, make life 
less enjoyable. Moreover, consider the terrible loss when some animals become extinct. Even 
insect extinction would have a negative impact on plants and consequently grains, vegetables, 
and fruit on which humans and animals rely.  
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Raising animals for food undermines the natural beauty of the world by domesticating 
and bringing into existence millions of animals for the purpose of slaughtering them and using 
their bodies for food. Note that this line of argument is not committing the naturalistic fallacy. 
The argument is not that what is natural is necessarily good. Rather, certain aspects of the world 
and certain human practices make life less enjoyable and less aesthetically pleasing. Apart from 
the fact that animals suffer, it is necessary to realize that the practice of raising animals for food 
contributes to the ugliness of the world. What is ugly about raising animals for food is the fact 
that millions of animals have to be brought into existence and slaughtered; it is known that this is 
the cause of global warming, deforestation, pollution, and other problems that affect the 
ecosystem. (DeLonge, 2018).  Also, it is hardly necessary to give a sophisticated argument to 
show that slaughterhouses are aesthetically unpleasant places—inside and outside—not just for 
the animals but also for humans who see or know about slaughterhouses and for the humans who 
work in them. What happens inside slaughterhouses cannot be said to add to the beauty of the 
world. There is nothing beautiful about a world of trucks loaded with animals that are forced into 
squalid slaughterhouses where the animals enter whole and exit in pieces. There’s nothing 
beautiful about the foul odor that slaughterhouses emanate or the waste that is produced by the 
slaughtering and preparation of meat. Moreover, we have to consider that regardless of 
slaughterhouses killing animals is not an aesthetically pleasant practice to perform or watch—
even for meat eaters. 
The beauty of animals to which I am referring is evident by the way that many people 
have companion animals. They find them lovable and cute and for many these animals fill an 
important gap in their hearts. As some have pointed out (Joy, 2011), it seems arbitrary that some 
animals are treated as companions and others as food. In fact, besides cats and dogs, also pigs, 
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cows, chickens, and others are lovable animals. Suppose that the overwhelming majority of 
scientific studies conclusively showed that animals do not feel pain. Descartes, for example, was 
convinced that animals were like nature’s robots. He argued that animals behave and look as if 
they were sentient, but in reality they are merely biomechanical machines. Assume that 
Descartes was right. Would people no longer become attached to companion animals? Would 
people abandon their companion animals just because these animals lack the capacity to feel 
pain? Would animals not matter any longer? I think it is clear that the answer is no. We 
contemplate the beauty of sunsets, the northern lights, the forests, and the oceans. Their beauty 
enriches us despite not being sentient things. By the same token, even under the assumption that 
animals do not feel pain, it seems to me that it would not change the fact that they are beautiful 
and their beauty, company, and presence in the world gives us an objective reason to not destroy 
them or raise them for food. It seems to me that regardless of whether animals can suffer, the 
practices involved in rearing and slaughtering animals are esthetically unpleasant features of the 
world, which is exactly what everyone—meat eaters and vegetarians—wants to avoid or 
eliminate. Thus the ugliness of slaughterhouses, animal overpopulation, and the damage to the 
environment caused by animal agriculture could constitute grounds for opposing raising animals 
for food, irrespective of animals’ capacity to suffer.  
A possible objection is the following: It is difficult to separate out the aesthetic concern 
regarding meat production from all the others. Almost any process in an industrialized system is 
going to be pretty ugly. But if a given process didn’t create a number of negative externalities, 
and people liked the product, then the ugliness would be a very weak reason to abandon 
that product for some alternative—likely not strong enough to condemn the practice of intensive 
animal agriculture, as I suggest. It is true that many processes may be considered ugly. I want to 
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offer two observations: first, there is a significant difference between the ugliness of, say, a giant 
metalworking factory or cleaning septic tanks and what goes on in slaughterhouses. As I have 
discussed above, slaughterhouses provoke disgust virtually universally, while metalworking 
factories do not. There are important evolutionary and psychological reasons that ground our 
disgust toward blood, bodily fluids, and other details involved in animal farming. However, I am 
not here to argue that metalworking factories or cleaning septic tanks are not ugly. Arguably they 
are, but some practices are more necessary and less ugly than others. And certain processes or 
aspects of life, such as intensive animal agriculture, can be controlled or eliminated; other 
processes, such as making cars or cleaning septic tanks, are not easily avoidable because are 
necessary aspects of our lives. Second, my aesthetic-based argument comes with a qualification, 
that we should condemn an ugly activity or practice whenever viable alternatives exist. Since 
vegetarianism and veganism are viable alternatives to intensive animal agriculture, we should 
condemn intensive animal agriculture. 
Furthermore, intensive animal agriculture does create a number of negative externalities, 
that is, a negative impact on the environment. I am referring to the environmental degradation 
caused by the various processes employed by animal agriculture. In 2018, the number of 
slaughtered animals in the United States alone is frightening, over forty-eight billions 
(https://animalclock.org/#section-links). This large number means, among many other things, 
more water usage, more animal waste, more pollution, more deforestation, more energy 
consumption, the exacerbation of the already serious issue of global warming (Pimentel, 2003). 
In short, raising animals for food is revealing unsustainable as a practice; it contributes to the 
degradation of the environment. (Carus, 2010; Walsh, 2013) The point here is that, once again, 
animal suffering is not necessary to denounce the practice of raising animals for food. It seems 
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clear that moral integrity demands that we avoid raising and killing animals for food to avoid an 
environmental disaster. This last point, however, does not apply globally, but rather to affluent 
societies that use intensive animal farming.  
III. Integrity 
The first part of the aesthetic argument explained in the previous section shows that there 
is pro tanto reason to condemn intensive animal agriculture because the practices of raising and 
slaughtering animals are unnecessarily unaesthetic. The second aspect of the aesthetic argument 
relies on the notion of Non-Violence. Arguably one of the most daunting aspects of society is the 
constant prevalence of aggression and violence. The argument is the following: 
1. Non-violence is a virtue in and of itself.  
2. Unnecessary violence ought to be avoided or eliminated. 
3. Intensive animal agriculture produces unnecessary—yet avoidable—violence. 
4. Therefore, intensive animal agriculture ought to be avoided or eliminated. 
Non-violence as a moral principle has been used as a peaceful way to attain political and social 
change by the likes of Jesus, Socrates, St. Francis of Assisi, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther 
King Jr., Lydia Maria Child, Violet Oakley, and others. (“Women Champion Peace & Justice 
through Nonviolence,” n.d.) What I argue here is simply that violence toward animals is 
recognized by many, and for obvious reasons, to be wrong because it hurts animals. However, 
apart from causing harm to animals, I argue that violence is inherently wrong. A similar 
argument was used by St. Pius V who issued a papal bull titled “De Salute Gregis Dominici” to 
ban bullfighting. Pius V was concerned about the danger of fighting animals; moreover, he was 
concerned about human souls. He understood that violence undermines human dignity. The 
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violence involved in the operations of the meat industry, should be condemned for the same 
reason.  
Timothy Pachirat, (2013) was still a Ph.D. student at Yale University when he gained 
employment in a slaughterhouse in Omaha for the purpose of writing his dissertation. At the 
slaughterhouse, his jobs were liver hanger, cattle driver, and quality control. During his 
employment in a slaughterhouse, he wrote what would later become the book Every Twelve 
Seconds. Chapter Three is the most difficult reading of the book because it describes in details 
the violence he experienced while working at the slaughterhouse. Pachirat describes the fear of 
the cattle as they approach the time of their death. After they are killed, workers cut the animals 
into pieces and remove the animals’ organs. Pachirat describes a slaughterhouse where thousands 
of animals are killed every day; here the stench of animal cadavers, the blood, the entrails, the 
fear of the animals are magnified compared with, say, a small farm where a farmer kills an 
animal to feed his family. But can killing an animal and preparing her flesh for consumption be 
done gently? Aside from the number of animals killed, in what sense does killing one or many 
differ? Some said that if slaughterhouses had glass walls, everyone would become vegetarian. 
One of the main reasons, in my view, is the useless violence of killing animals for food.  
Some reader will immediately retort that killing is not always wrong. Perhaps that is the 
case, but my argument is that useless violence is always wrong, and we are better off without it. 
Killing and then slaughtering an animal for food inherently involves violence. The details of 
killing for food a placid creature such as a cow or a gregarious animal such as a pig will bring 
most sensitive people to tears and make them sick to their stomach. This is not a fallacious 
appeal to pity. My argument is not that killing cute and innocent creatures is immoral because 
they are cute and innocent. My point is that killing and slaughtering involves violence, and 
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violence is not moral or desirable. One may point out that there are exceptions in extreme 
circumstances, say, when it is necessary to save lives. I am not arguing that because violence is 
wrong we should never use violent means in the face of extreme danger. The point that I want to 
make is that most people would be consternated by the killing, death, and slaughtering of 
animals regardless of whether animals can feel pain. It is not (necessarily) our understanding that 
animals have the capacity of suffering that makes us cringe at the idea of killing and preparing an 
animal for consumption. It is the overt violence of using instruments such as knives, hammers, 
nail guns, and more to cut, pierce, smash, tear. It is the instruments used to kill, the stench of 
death, the horrid sight of blood and entrails that follows the death of an animal.  
Granted, it is not the same for everyone. These aspects may not affect some people in the 
slightest. But most people would refuse to kill an animal for food because of the violent acts 
necessary to kill and cut up the flesh of that animal. Compare slaughtering with peeling an 
orange or taking some lettuce from the garden. Eating vegetables does not involve violence. 
After all, it seems to me that slaughterhouses do the dirty job that people would otherwise hate to 
do—and that’s why their walls are not made of glass. Meat eaters in a sense delegate this 
violence to Slaughterhouses. Now regardless of whether animals can suffer like humans or in a 
similar way or not at all, the violence involved that I describe is an objective reason for opposing 
to raising and killing animals for food. Most people would feel uncomfortable performing such 
violent acts as killing an animal and cutting up, slicing, deboning the flesh of that animal. This is 
the first aspect of integrity to which I am referring. 
Another way to understand the intrinsic value of nonviolence is to point out that violence 
generates more violence. Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant both discuss this aspect. Thomas 
Aquinas argued that despite their capacities that are similar to those of men, it is not a sin to kill 
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animals because God created them for the benefit of humans. However, in Summa Contra 
Gentiles (1480), Aquinas states that animals exist for our benefit. However, this fact does not 
warrant animal cruelty. In fact, cruelty to animals should be avoided. He writes, “If a man 
practice a pitiful affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-
men.” (Aquinas, 2016, I-II 99, 1). Immanuel Kant echoes Aquinas. In Lecture on Ethics, Kant 
states, “he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.” (1963, p. 24) 
The point that Aquinas and Kant make seems to me to be plausible. As Sarah Watts (2018), 
writes, “Jeffrey Dahmer. Ted Bundy. David Berkowitz. Aside from killing dozens of innocent 
people (combined), these men—and a significant percentage of other serial killers—have 
something else in common: Years before turning their rage on human beings, they practiced on 
animals.” (https://www.aetv.com/real-crime/first-they-tortured-animals-then-they-turned-to-
humans) Consequently, even in this case, it is possible to condemn intensive animal agriculture 
independently of the notion of suffering. As Aquinas points out it is plausible that exhibiting 
compassion toward animals, it is likely that we also exhibit compassion toward other human 
beings. And as Kant points out, the fact that animals feel pain is not what’s morally relevant. 
Rather, we should treat animals with respect because being cruel to animals makes humans 
become cruel to each other. Following this line of reasoning, combined with what I said earlier 
about the violence involved in killing and preparing animals for food, it seems to me that yet 
another reason to oppose the practice of using animals for food is that it numbs our sense of 
compassion and it raises our threshold for cruelty. 
 
IV. Gustatory  
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Many philosophers arguing in favor of vegetarianism point out that food flavor should be 
regarded as subordinate to the life and well being of animals. (Singer, 1989, p. 7) Meat eaters 
(and many vegetarians, as well) remind us all the time how good meat tastes and, consequently, 
how hard it is to give it up. Even the very Rosalind Hursthouse (2006) arguing in defense of 
vegetarianism writes, “Once again, honesty compels me to admit that I do not need meat, I just 
like it. A lot.” (p. 142) However, many recognize that the taste of meat and experience of eating 
it are, morally speaking, less important than animal suffering. Thus they conclude that since taste 
is trivial in comparison with animal suffering, we ought to give up eating meat. Lately, some 
philosophers (Kazez, 2018, Lomasky, 2013) have argued against the notion that taste is a 
morally trivial aspect of the morality of eating meat. They have maintained that taste is not trivial 
at all, but rather an important value to a good life that may justify rearing animals for food. 
Eating well, they argue, is a significant value to humans, and eating meat is a significant part of 
eating well. Consequently, not eating meat is a significant value-loss.  
I do not dispute that eating well and the role of flavor are important values to humans. 
However, I have three objections: First, plant-based food tastes good—even superior to meat 
according to many meat eaters who have become vegans. I think it is important to consider that 
many vegans and vegetarians, who formerly consumed meat, and thus know both worlds, prefer 
the taste of plant-based food. Second, the notion that not eating meat is a significant value-loss to 
humans is an exaggeration. Perhaps, the “not eating meat is a value-loss to humans” argument 
would have some force under these conditions: if taste of meat were somehow essential to 
humans in the sense that without it humans would get ill or life would be utterly unbearable; or if 
meat were the only food that tastes good. Clearly neither is the case. Humans can easily adjust 
their taste, and plant food tastes just as good or even better than meat. Furthermore, considering 
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the aesthetic-based argument, and given the environmental argument, it is sensible to adjust 
one’s taste to plant-based food, which avoids and prevents health problems and environmental 
degradation.  
Third, meat is not inherently good. Meat dishes become delicious under the chef’s skillful 
hands. I anticipate resistance here. It may be objected that this applies to vegetarian food as well. 
Also, it may be pointed out that flavor is subjective. I argue that it can be shown that vegetarian 
food is inherently flavorful while meat is not. Fruit and greens and even grains don’t require 
special preparation or seasoning. Mangos, bananas, watermelons, spinach, peppers, and more, 
are flavorful in their raw state or just by minimally cooking them. There are vegetables that when 
raw have little taste or cannot be eaten. For example, broccoli and eggplants are not ideal eaten 
raw. However, they are not repulsive and with very simple cooking methods, such as steaming, 
they become flavorful. On the other hand, meat is foul when raw and requires certain steps 
necessary to render it edible. In fact, unlike vegetables, meat is the flesh of once living animals 
now cut and shaped in ways that do not resemble animals. Also, meat requires maturation. 
Maturation means that the flesh of a slaughtered animal is aged for at least a few days, 
sometimes up to several weeks. This process is necessary to tenderize the tough muscle fibers. 
Furthermore, meat is never consumed as is. With very few exceptions, people would never kill, 
say, a cow or pig or chicken, carve out the flesh and consume it on the spot. Meat is always aged, 
marinated, seasoned, and cooked. For example, consider a popular dish typical of the Italian 
region of Piedmont called brasato. This dish is cattle flesh braised in red wine and spices for 
hours. The point is to render the meat tender and allow it to acquire the taste of the wine and the 
spices because it is tough and unpleasant tasting. In other words, taste is conferred upon the meat 
by the wine and the spices and through hours of cooking. Another dish typical of the Italian 
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region of Bologna is a sauce with ground beef known as ragú, not to be confused with the 
Italian-style American brand Ragú. This sauce is prepared by sautéing the ground meat in oil and 
adding to it, again, wine. The reason is to fix the foul taste of the animal flesh and make it taste 
interesting with the use of wine and spices and transform it into a dish. After all, meat is, like it 
or not, decomposing flesh. It is true that vegetables and fruits decompose, too, but in that case we 
avoid consumption and discard them. All meat is prepared with some kinds of powerful spices, 
oils, or wine, and is cooked to modify its naturally foul flavor.  
With regard to taste, consider Anderson & Feldman (2016), who tested whether people’s 
beliefs of how animals are raised can influence their experience of eating them. Samples of meat 
were accompanied by respective descriptions of their origins and treatment of the animals on 
factory farms. Some samples were said to be the product of factory farm, while others were 
labeled as “humane”. In reality, all the meat samples were identical. Interestingly, the 
participants of this study experienced the samples differently: meat described “factory farmed” 
was perceived as looking, smelling, and tasting as less pleasant than “humane” meat. The 
difference was even to the degree that factory farmed meat was said to taste more salty and 
greasy than “humane” meat. Furthermore, the participants who were told that they were eating 
factory-farmed meat consumed less of the sample. According to the authors of this study, “These 
findings demonstrate that the experience of eating is not determined solely by physical properties 
of stimuli—beliefs also shape experience.” (Anderson & Feldman, 2016, p. 16). My point is that 
meat is not consumed because it is good in itself. It is rendered good by masking or modifying its 
original flavor with the use of potent spices or liquids used to marinate, season, and cook the 
meat. Furthermore, meat is enjoyed because it is eaten socially, during holidays for example. The 
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taste is not consistent and not exactly pleasant, as the study just mentioned explains. Thus, my 
argument is that, 
1. Meat is not inherently flavorful, but rather unappetizing. 
2. Whatever is inherently unappetizing should not be consumed.   
3. Therefore, meat should not be consumed. 
I think that there is good evidence to show that the first premise is true. Also most meat eaters 
would, in good conscience, concede this much. The second premise needs to be unpacked, 
especially in light of an obvious objection: it might be objected that it is irrelevant whether a 
given product is good in itself. What matters is how it contributes to a dish. And most people 
seem to think that animal products make dishes taste better than they would 
without them. Firstly, premise 2 is not meant to apply universally. It applies to affluent societies 
where people have easy access to an abundance of nutritious plant-based food. I do not claim 
that it applies to a circumstance where one, say, is stranded on a desert island, compelled to eat a 
food that provides sustenance but is not tasty.  
Secondly, the reason we should avoid food inherently unappetizing in the case of meat is 
to avoid self-deception. That is, since meat is not inherently tasty, as I discussed above certain 
steps must be taken to mask its unpleasant taste, appearance, smell, and texture by curing, 
seasoning, and cooking it. Taking such steps constitutes an act of self-deception. Since one 
should avoid deceiving oneself, it follows that one should avoid eating meat. It is not the taste of 
meat itself that meat eaters like, but rather the taste of the seasoning, spices, and flavors created 
by the cooking process. Thus, realizing these facts may constitute a reason for one to avoid 
eating meat. I can see that this argument may not convince many, especially meat eaters. 
However, the main point is that it need not convince all. As Allen W. Wood aptly puts it, “Some 
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philosophers seem to think that each proposition in a theory must be argued…using arguments 
that are supposed to persuade anyone at all, even someone with no sympathy whatever for the 
project in which the theory is engaged. That is a standard that no philosophical theory could ever 
meet.” (Wood, 2008, p. 1) In fact, I do not pretend to persuade anyone at all, but rather those 
sympathetic with the project of condemning factory farming and supporting vegetarianism or 
veganism on the basis of principles that do not rely on the notion of animal suffering. With this 
consideration in mind, the above argument accomplishes such a goal. 
 
V. Conclusion 
It has been argued that a common trend in animal ethics is the move from the notion of 
animal suffering to veganism or vegetarianism. The argument is roughly the following: those 
animals used for food are said to be sentient, i.e., they have the capacity to suffer.  Causing 
unnecessary suffering is wrong. For those of us who are fortunate to live in places where plant-
based food abounds, killing animals for food is unnecessary. Consequently, killing animals for 
food is wrong. Obviously philosophers present this argument with several intermediate steps. At 
any rate, the point of this paper is that animal suffering is not all that matters. If it were 
discovered that animals do not feel any more pain that rocks, would there be other moral 
considerations regarding using animals for food? I maintained that there are other arguments that 
can be used to condemn the practice of intensive animal agriculture and support vegetarianism or 
veganism. These arguments are aesthetic-, gustatory-based.  
First, the practices required to rear animals and transforming them into food are 
aesthetically repugnant. Our natural aversion to practices that are aesthetically distasteful, such 
as slaughtering, carries moral implications sufficient to condemn animal agriculture. This 
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argument has two ramifications: one, we want to avoid unnecessary ugliness in the world, and 
animal agriculture brings about a great deal of unnecessary ugliness. Our natural aversion to 
blood, flesh, and other repugnant aspects involved in animal food production signal that 
something is bad for us. Its deleterious effects on human health further corroborate the badness 
of animal food consumption. Second, animal agriculture is inherently, and unnecessarily, 
violent—and it instills in us violence. Since we should value non-violence as a virtue, it follows 
that we should avoid those practices that are inherently, and unnecessarily, violent, such as meat 
production in the presence of an abundance of plant-based food. Furthermore, a valid reason to 
embrace veganism, aside from animal suffering, is to realize that meat is not inherently tasty. 
Rather, meat is rendered palatable by masking its naturally foul taste with various spices, 
condiments, and cooking techniques. Since eating such foods is a form or self-deception, I argue 
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